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      Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

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      SKU 9780195300796 Categories ,
      This book provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and coninuing to research frontier. Detailed theoretical arguments are complemented by copious exmaples and economic applications of th...

      £110.00

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      Description

      Product ID:9780195300796
      Product Form:Hardback
      Country of Manufacture:US
      Title:Repeated Games and Reputations
      Subtitle:Long-Run Relationships
      Authors:Author: George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson
      Page Count:672
      Subjects:Economic theory and philosophy, Economic theory & philosophy, Economic systems and structures, Economic systems & structures
      Description:This book provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and coninuing to research frontier. Detailed theoretical arguments are complemented by copious exmaples and economic applications of the theory.
      Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
      Imprint Name:Oxford University Press Inc
      Publisher Name:Oxford University Press Inc
      Country of Publication:GB
      Publishing Date:2006-10-12

      Additional information

      Weight1312 g
      Dimensions262 × 188 × 35 mm